Table of Contents
A Story About Related Party Transactions
When the Bossβs Brother Gets the Contract:
Imagine you’re part of a housing society that needs a contractor to repaint the entire building. Several professionals submit quotes, but the societyβs secretaryβwho controls the decisionβinsists on hiring his own brother’s company.
His brotherβs quote is higher than the others. The quality of work is average. But the deal still goes through. Why? Because of the relationshipβnot the merit.
This is a classic example of a related party transaction.
In the business world, these kinds of deals happen when a company does business with someone closely connectedβlike a relative of a director, another company owned by the CEO, or even a subsidiary. And just like in our housing society, these deals can put fairness and accountability at risk.
When companies favor their “own people” instead of making decisions in the best interest of all stakeholders, it becomes a serious corporate governance issue. Money can be misused, shareholders may lose trust, and companies can even collapse under the weight of hidden deals.
In this blog, we’ll break down what related party transactions really are, how they work, and why theyβre often a red flag for investors and regulators alike.
π’ Which Companies Are Covered?
| Type of Company | RPT Rules Applicable? |
|---|---|
| Private Companies | Yes, but with some exemptions (e.g. relaxed approvals in certain cases) |
| Public Unlisted Companies | Yes, governed by the Companies Act, 2013 |
| Listed Companies | Yes, very strict rules under SEBI LODR Regulations |
| Subsidiaries of Listed Cos | Yes, indirectly covered under consolidated compliance requirements |
π What Are Related Party Transactions (RPTs)?
Related Party Transactions (RPTs) are business deals between a company and someone it has a close relationship with β like a director, major shareholder, or a company owned by a relative of management.
These are not ordinary, armβs-length deals. Instead, thereβs a risk that the decision might be biased because of personal interests.
π Examples:
- A company gives a loan to its CEOβs brotherβs business.
- A company buys services from a firm owned by the chairpersonβs son.
- A listed company sells assets to its own subsidiary at a lower-than-market price.
π§Ύ Who is a Related Party? β Quick Reference Table
| Category | Who is Included |
|---|---|
| 1. Key Management Personnel | – Directors (Board members) – CEO, CFO, Company Secretary, etc. |
| 2. Relatives of Key Personnel | – Spouse – Parents – Children (including step-children) – Siblings |
| 3. Holding Company | – The parent company that owns or controls the reporting company |
| 4. Subsidiary Company | – A company that is controlled by the reporting company |
| 5. Associate Company | – A company in which the reporting company holds significant influence (β₯20%) |
| 6. Joint Venture Partner | – A company that has a joint control agreement with the reporting company |
| 7. Shareholders with Influence | – Persons or entities owning β₯20% shares or voting power |
| 8. Entities Controlled by Related People | – Firms or companies where directors/relatives hold β₯20% ownership or control |
| 9. Partnership Firms or HUFs | – Where directors/relatives are partners or members |
| 10. Others (As per Law) | – Any person on whose advice a director or manager routinely acts |
β οΈ Why Are RPTs a Red Flag in Corporate Governance?
Though RPTs can be legitimate, they raise concerns when used to favor insiders or siphon off company value. Hereβs why regulators and investors stay alert:
π© 1. Conflict of Interest
- The decision-maker may benefit personally, instead of acting in the companyβs or shareholdersβ best interest.
π© 2. Lack of Fair Pricing
- Prices may not reflect market value (e.g., selling assets cheaply to a directorβs firm).
π© 3. Diversion of Funds
- Money may be moved out of the company under the guise of a legitimate transaction, especially in loans and guarantees.
π© 4. Suppression of True Financial Health
- Profits/losses may be manipulated by transacting with related entities.
π© 5. Weak Internal Controls
- If oversight is weak, RPTs can be used for fraud, bribery, or enrichment of promoters.
π Impact on Investors & Stakeholders
- Reduced trust in financial reporting
- Lower valuation of the company due to governance risk
- Potential for regulatory action or penalties
- In extreme cases, business collapse (e.g., Satyam, IL&FS)
β Are Related Party Transactions Allowed?
Yes, they are allowed, but only under certain conditions:
- Must be done at armβs length (i.e., on fair market terms)
- Must be approved by the right authority within the company
- Must be disclosed properly
Related Party Transactions (RPTs) are not completely banned, but they are heavily regulated to ensure transparency, fairness, and accountability.
βοΈ How Do Related Party Transactions Work?
- Identification of a Related Party:
- The company identifies whether the counterparty is a related person/entity.
- This includes directors, key managerial personnel (KMP), their relatives, and entities controlled by them.
- Nature of Transaction:
- Sale/purchase of goods or property
- Loans or guarantees
- Transfer of resources, services, or obligations
- Approval Process:
- Audit Committee approval (mandatory for listed companies)
- Board approval for transactions beyond certain thresholds or not in the ordinary course
- Shareholder approval for large (material) transactions
- Disclosure:
- Must be disclosed in financial statements, annual reports, and for listed firms, to the stock exchange.
β Whose Approval is Required for RPTs?
| Type of RPT | Required Approval |
|---|---|
| At armβs length & in ordinary course of business | No prior approval needed, but must be disclosed in financials |
| Not at armβs length OR not in ordinary course | Board of Directors approval is required |
| Material RPTs (large value transactions) | Must be approved by shareholders via special resolution |
| Listed Companies | Also need approval from Audit Committee before execution |
π Note:
- Interested directors cannot vote on RPTs in board meetings.
- For listed companies, all RPTs (even if armβs length) must go through the Audit Committee.
π What is a “Material” RPT?
As per SEBI (India) norms:
- A transaction is material if it exceeds βΉ1,000 crore or 10% of the companyβs annual consolidated turnover, whichever is lower.
π€ What Does “Armβs Length” Mean?
“Armβs length” is a term used to describe a fair and independent transaction between two parties who are not related and have no conflict of interest.
It means both parties act in their own self-interest, negotiate freely, and the deal reflects true market value β just like it would between strangers.
π Key Features of an Armβs Length Transaction:
| Feature | What It Means |
|---|---|
| No special relationship | The buyer and seller are not family, partners, or insiders. |
| Fair pricing | The price is based on what the product/service is worth in the open market. |
| Independent decision | Both parties act independently, without pressure or influence from the other. |
| Comparable to market deals | Similar terms would apply if the same deal happened with an unrelated party. |
π‘ Simple Example:
β Armβs Length:
You sell your house to a stranger for βΉ50 lakh after comparing market rates and negotiating freely.
β Not Armβs Length:
You sell the same house to your cousin for βΉ30 lakh β because of your relationship, not fair market value.
π’ In a Business Context:
Letβs say a company hires a vendor for office catering:
- β If the vendor is selected through open bidding, with competitive pricing β Armβs length
- β If the vendor is the CEOβs brother, and no other bids were considered β Not armβs length
β οΈ Why It Matters in Corporate Governance:
If a related party transaction is not at armβs length, there’s a higher risk of:
- Favoritism
- Overpayment or underpricing
- Conflict of interest
- Shareholder loss
Thatβs why companies must prove that RPTs are done at armβs length, or else get board/shareholder approval.
π Summary:
- RPTs are not illegal, but they must be approved by the Board, Audit Committee, and sometimes shareholders.
- Disclosure is mandatory in annual reports and stock exchange filings (for listed companies).
- Strong rules apply especially to listed companies, where public money is involved.
π Case Study: Satyam Computers Scam (India, 2009)
βIndiaβs Enronβ β How a related party deal exposed massive fraud
π’ The Company:

Satyam Computer Services Ltd.
A leading Indian IT services company, once hailed as a blue-chip stock listed on the BSE, NSE, and NYSE.
In 2008, Satyam Computer Services Ltd., a publicly listed company on the NSE, BSE, and NYSE, shocked the corporate world with a failed attempt to acquire two companies β Maytas Infra and Maytas Properties. The twist? Both companies were owned by its Chairman Ramalinga Rajuβs family.
π The Problem:
In 2008, Satyam’s board approved a related party transaction β a $1.6 billion deal to acquire two infrastructure companies:
- Maytas Properties
- Maytas Infra
These companies were owned and controlled by the family of Satyamβs Chairman, Ramalinga Raju.
The deal was not in Satyamβs core business (IT), and the pricing was opaque and hugely inflated.
π¨ Red Flags:
| Red Flag | Explanation |
|---|---|
| β Same promoter group | Raju controlled both buyer (Satyam) and sellers (Maytas firms) |
| β Overpriced assets | Infrastructure companies were valued far above their worth |
| β No shareholder approval | The transaction bypassed shareholder consultation initially |
| β Conflict of interest | Rajuβs personal interests clashed with those of the shareholders |
| β Outrage from investors & analysts | Stock plummeted 55% in a single day post-announcement |
π£ What Happened Next:
This related party transaction (RPT) raised immediate red flags. The deal had no clear business logic, involved massive sums, and was with entities directly controlled by the promoterβs family. At the time, RPTs were governed in India by Clause 49 of the SEBI Listing Agreement, which required listed companies to ensure transparency and board oversight in such transactions.
However, oversight mechanisms failed. The board approved the deal, ignoring glaring conflicts of interest and valuation concerns.
Next –
- After intense backlash, investor pressure, the deal was aborted.
- A few weeks later, Raju confessed to a massive βΉ7,000+ crore accounting fraud.
- He had inflated cash and bank balances for years to make the company look profitable.
- The aborted RPT was seen as an attempt to fill the hole by diverting cash to related entities.
βοΈ Consequences:
| Stakeholder | Outcome |
|---|---|
| Chairman (Raju) | Arrested and jailed; confessed in a written letter to the board |
| Board of Directors | Dismissed; faced criticism for failing to exercise independent judgment |
| Company | Takeover by Tech Mahindra in 2009 through government intervention |
| Auditors (PwC) | Found guilty of negligence; partners arrested; lost credibility |
| Investors | Massive wealth erosion; shares crashed by over 80% |
| Regulators (SEBI, MCA) | Tightened norms for RPT disclosures, corporate governance, and audit standards |
Case Study: The DHFL Scam (India, 2019-2021)

When Loans Go Home: The Dark Side of Related Party Transactions
Lets see a real world case study of how one of India’s largest housing finance companies collapsed under its own web of shady deals.
π΅οΈββοΈ DHFL’s Web of Related Party Transactions
In 2019, investors were stunned when Dewan Housing Finance Corporation Ltd. (DHFL) β once a trusted name in affordable housing loans β was accused of siphoning off over βΉ30,000 crore through a network of related party transactions.
What followed was a stunning corporate collapse that revealed how unchecked insider deals, fake loans, and regulatory gaps can devastate even the biggest companies.
This is not just a story of fraud β itβs a blueprint of what can go wrong when personal interests override public trust.
π The Allegations:
In early 2019, investigative reports revealed that DHFL had:
- Given thousands of crores in loans to obscure shell companies
- These firms had no real operations and were linked to the Wadhawan family (DHFLβs promoters)
- Many of these loans were never repaid β but still shown as “performing assets” in the books
π How the Scam Worked
| Step | What Happened |
|---|---|
| ποΈ Fake shell companies created | Promoter-linked firms were set up with dummy directors |
| π° DHFL lent huge amounts | Loans given with little or no due diligence |
| π Loans shown as assets | These inflated the balance sheet and misled investors |
| π Money round-tripped | Some funds allegedly returned to the promoters or used for unrelated activities |
ποΈ Timeline of the DHFL Collapse
(Visual Suggestion: Horizontal Timeline Graphic)
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Early 2019 | CobraPost exposΓ© alleges βΉ31,000 crore siphoned via shell firms |
| June 2019 | DHFL delays bond repayment; panic begins among investors |
| Nov 2019 | RBI supersedes DHFLβs board due to governance failure |
| 2020 | ED and CBI file multiple cases against promoters under PMLA & IPC |
| Jan 2021 | DHFL becomes the first NBFC sent to NCLT for bankruptcy under IBC |
| June 2021 | Piramal Group wins bid to acquire DHFL in βΉ34,000 crore resolution plan |
βοΈ Legal Violations Involved
- Section 188 of the Companies Act, 2013 (RPT approval rules violated)
- SEBI (LODR) Regulations (lack of disclosure of material RPTs)
- PMLA, IPC, and Fraud under ED/CBI investigation
- RBI Guidelines for NBFCs (breach of lending norms)
π₯ Consequences of the Scam
| Stakeholder | Impact |
|---|---|
| Promoters | Arrested and charged with fraud and money laundering |
| Company (DHFL) | Declared bankrupt; acquired by Piramal Group after βΉ30,000+ crore write-off |
| Investors | Major losses to mutual funds, FDs, retail bondholders |
| Auditors | Investigated for negligence and failure to flag irregularities |
| Regulators | RBI & SEBI tightened norms on NBFC governance and RPT monitoring |
πΈ What Happened to DHFL Investors?
After DHFLβs bankruptcy and resolution through the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) process, the outcomes varied based on type of investor:
π¨βπΌ 1. Shareholders (Equity Investors)
β
Did they get anything back?
No. DHFL shares were delisted and shareholders got nothing.
- Piramal Groupβs takeover offer (βΉ34,250 crore) wiped out all existing equity.
- As per IBC rules, equity shareholders are last in line β after secured and unsecured creditors.
- On June 14, 2021, DHFL shares were delisted from NSE and BSE.
- Investors lost 100% of their capital in DHFL stock.
π» Outcome:
Complete loss for retail and institutional shareholders.
π 2. Bondholders (NCD Holders, Debenture Investors)
π Mixed outcome β partial recovery.
- DHFL had issued Non-Convertible Debentures (NCDs) to retail and institutional investors.
- Under Piramalβs resolution plan:
- Secured bondholders received between 40%β65% of their money, depending on the class and seniority.
- Unsecured bondholders received almost nothing or token value (~1% or less).
π¦ Why the difference?
- Secured creditors (banks, large institutions) had charge over DHFLβs assets.
- Unsecured NCD holders, including many retail investors, had no asset protection.
π» Outcome:
- Partial recovery for secured NCDs
- Heavy losses (up to 90β100%) for unsecured ones
π¦ 3. Fixed Deposit (FD) Holders
π Small recovery.
- FD holders were treated as unsecured creditors under the IBC process.
- Most received small payouts β around 23%β30% of their deposit amounts (in staggered installments).
- Many senior citizens who invested in DHFL FDs suffered huge losses, with no full refund.
π» Outcome:
Partial recovery (majority lost 70%+)
π οΈ What Did Piramal Group Actually Do?
- Piramal acquired DHFLβs assets and loan book for βΉ34,250 crore through IBC.
- It merged DHFL into its financial services arm and is now operating the business under Piramal Capital & Housing Finance Ltd.
- No funds were paid to DHFLβs original shareholders.
- Funds were distributed as per the IBC waterfall mechanism (secured > unsecured > shareholders).
π§ Investor Takeaways:
| Lesson | Implication |
|---|---|
| Equity is high-risk, high-return | Youβre the first to gain in success, but the last to be paid in a collapse. |
| NCDs β 100% safe | Especially when unsecured β read the terms and credit rating carefully. |
| FDs in NBFCs carry credit risk | Unlike bank FDs, NBFC deposits are not insured by RBI or DICGC. |
| IBC protects creditors, not shareholders | Resolution prioritizes repayment of debt, not market value recovery. |
π Lessons for Investors & Corporate Boards
- Always review a companyβs RPT disclosures in annual reports
- Be skeptical of unusual loan growth to private or unknown firms
- Strong audit committees and independent directors are vital to protect stakeholders
- Regulators must be empowered with real-time data and greater enforcement teeth
π§© Final Thoughts
The DHFL collapse is a cautionary tale for the financial system. It shows how Related Party Transactions, when hidden behind complex structures, can silently destroy companies from within.
Transparency, oversight, and accountability are not just compliance termsβthey are the pillars of trust in any public company.
π Conclusion: The Cost Wasnβt Just Financial β It Was Human
Behind the balance sheets, court filings, and corporate headlines of the DHFL scam were real people.
A retired schoolteacher who invested her life savings in a DHFL fixed deposit, trusting its brand and credit ratings.
A middle-class family saving for their childβs education, who thought NCDs offered both safety and better returns.
Thousands of small investors β senior citizens, homemakers, salaried professionals β who never imagined that a regulated, publicly listed housing finance company could vanish overnight, taking their hard-earned money with it.
For them, the collapse wasnβt about bad headlines or stock charts β it was about shattered trust, sleepless nights, and a future suddenly uncertain.
While the promoters walked away under legal proceedings, and financial institutions counted their write-downs, retail investors were left with nothing but regret β no refunds, no justice, just silence.
The DHFL story reminds us that financial scams donβt just destroy companies β they destroy lives. Itβs a call for stronger accountability, stricter governance, and most importantly, for protecting the everyday investor who simply believed that their money was in safe hands.
π Key Takeaways:
- RPTs can be used to hide fraud or divert funds if not monitored.
- Boards must act independently and question transactions, even if initiated by promoters.
- Audit Committees and shareholders must have full transparency before approving such deals.
- The scandal triggered regulatory reforms in India, including stricter norms under the Companies Act 2013 and SEBI regulations.
β Conclusion
Not all RPTs are badβbut unchecked RPTs are dangerous. Theyβre like secret deals in a family-run shop where customers (investors) donβt know whatβs really happening behind the scenes. Thatβs why regulators, auditors, and investors pay close attention to them.
π£ Call to Action: For a Safer, Fairer Financial System
β For Regulators:
- Tighten enforcement around RPTs.
- Mandate real-time, digital disclosures for high-value transactions.
- Ensure promoter accountability doesnβt stop with resignations.
β For Boards & Auditors:
- Treat every RPT like a potential conflict, not just a compliance checkbox.
- Build a culture where questioning is a duty, not disrespect.
β For Investors:
- Always read the Related Party Transactions section in annual reports.
- Be wary of sudden, unexplained shifts in business focus or large intra-group loans.
- If it smells fishy β it probably is.
β For Policy Makers:
- Create fast-track grievance redressal for small investors caught in corporate fraud.
- Introduce retail investor insurance for deposits in regulated NBFCs.
π Letβs not wait for another Satyam or DHFL to act.
Because behind every βrelated partyβ is an unrelated investor who may lose everything β and they deserve better.
Read Corporate Governance Best Practices here.
References:
π 1. Companies Act, 2013 β Section 188: Related Party Transactions
Governs how companies can enter into contracts with related parties. It includes approval requirements by board/shareholders and defines “related party.”
π Companies Act, 2013
β Refer to Section 188, page 101β102.
π 2. SEBI (LODR) Regulations, 2015 β Regulation 23: Related Party Transactions
Covers disclosure and approval requirements for listed entities. Applies stricter norms, mandates audit committee oversight, and shareholder approval in certain cases.
πSEBI
β See Regulation 23 in Chapter IV.
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